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Abstract:  
We investigate the design of incentives for public good quality provision in a dynamic 
regulation setting in which maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable 
effects. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetries of 
information can lead to over-provision of quality under optimal regulation, reflecting a 
dynamic rent extraction motive. When the regulator hires a single agent to manage 
public good quality, over-provision of quality can also occur as a result of quality 
pooling, which typically occurs if quality depreciates slowly and the discount factor is 
large. We further show that for small levels of asymmetric information, the regulator 
prefers to hire a single agent rather than to contract with a sequence of agents, 
provided all parties can commit to a long-term contract. When no such commitment is 
feasible, the fact that quality physically links periods together leads to a ratchet effect 
even when private information is recurring, and shorter franchises are beneficial from 
a social point of view. 
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1. Introduction
The provision of quality by public utilities or regulated firms more generally is one of the main
objectives of regulatory activity. Besides securing basic services such as electricity supply or
voice and data transmission, regulators attempt to incite regulated firms to provide adequate
levels of service enhancements that aﬀect final customers’ welfare. For instance, the speed
and clarity of transmissions are key dimensions of quality in the telecommunications sector,
as is the reliability of supply in the energy sector.
The literature on the regulation of quality has mostly focused on static frameworks,
with special emphasis on the issue of quality verifiability (Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), Lewis
and Sappington (1991, 1992)). However, in many cases, the management of quality can be
properly understood only in a dynamic context. For instance, the maintenance of a road or
electricity network requires sustained eﬀorts, while the network itself is subject to exogenous
events which aﬀect the quality of the service it provides to final customers. Similarly, the
quality of water supply is aﬀected by exogenous polluting activities, and requires continuing
cleaning up eﬀorts. In all these examples, public good quality evolves over time as a result of
maintenance eﬀorts and exogenous random shocks, and these eﬀorts and shocks have long-
lasting eﬀects. As a result of this, quality is a durable characteristic which can be viewed as a
capital stock: the current quality of service depends on its past levels. This paper analyzes the
problem of optimal regulation of public good quality in such a dynamic environment. In this
framework, we endeavor to shed light on the following questions: What is the best incentive
scheme when the regulated firm’s decisions aﬀect the level of quality available both in the
present and in the future? Does private information systematically lead to under-provision
of quality, as in a static environment?
Our analysis focuses on the case where the quality of the public good is verifiable. That
is, quality can be described ex ante in a contract and certified ex post in court, and, as a
result of this, the regulator can directly impose a quality target on the regulated firm, or more
generally reward or punish the firm directly as a function of quality improvements. This is
most relevant for industries such as electricity, where the number and intensity of outages can
be ascertained in an almost costless way, or water supply, in which the chemical composition
of water provides an accurate measure of its quality for final customers.1 While quality itself
is verifiable, we assume that the factors governing its evolution over time cannot be verified
separately, and are private information of the regulated firm. Thus, in line with Lewis and
Sappington (1991), the regulator cannot determine the portion of overall quality that can
be respectively attributed to the regulated firm’s maintenance eﬀorts and to the exogenous
quality shocks. Quality shocks are assumed to be independently distributed across periods.
Hence, the only link between periods is physical rather than informational. For simplicity,
we consider a binomial model in which only high and low quality shocks can occur.
1As pointed out by De Fraja and Iozzi (2004), there have been in practice two types of regulatory responses
to the problem of securing an adequate quality service (see also Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994)). First,
the imposition of quality standards, enforced through legal sanctions. Second, the imposition of a link between
the firm’s allowed revenues and prices and the quality of the service it provides. For instance, in the UK water
industry, price cap adjustments are based on comparative performance indicators (OFWAT (2002)). Similarly,
UK energy distribution companies receive financial compensations according to various quality indicators
(OFGEM (2001)). Note that these two types of mechanisms require at least some dimensions of quality to be
verifiable by a court. De Fraja and Iozzi (2004) propose an extension of the Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979)
dynamic model of price regulation that allows for such price-quality tradeoﬀs. They do not address the issue
of quality durability, which is the objective of the present paper.
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Two regulatory frameworks are considered in turn. We first analyze the dynamics of
quality in a stationary setup in which the regulator delegates the management of quality to
a sequence of firms or agents, one for each period. This allows us to disentangle the question
of quality dynamics from that of the provision of dynamic incentives, which is addressed in
the second part of the paper. A key assumption of the model is that each agent must receive
a non-negative utility in each state of nature. That is, no contract can be enforced whereby
a truthful agent could potentially incur losses. Within each period, the timing is as follows.
After signing a contract with the regulator, which depends on the current level of quality, the
agent in charge privately learns his type, that is, the current realization of the quality shock,
and then privately chooses his maintenance eﬀort. Transfers are then eﬀected according to
the achieved level of quality.
Because the agents must receive a non-negative utility in each state of nature, the fact that
the quality shocks are privately observed by the agents leads to a sequence of non-degenerate
moral hazard problems. The main diﬀerence with a static framework is that the social value
of quality reflects not only the current social benefit of quality, but also its impact on the
continuation game played by the regulator and the future agents. Accordingly, maintenance
eﬀorts and transfers will vary over time with the quality of the public good. Using standard
recursive techniques (Stokey and Lucas (1989)), we characterize the social value of quality
under both symmetric and asymmetric information. A key result of our analysis is that the
marginal social value of quality is strictly higher under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction eﬀect. Indeed, the informational
rent that the regulator must leave to the current agent in case of a high quality shock is
decreasing in the current level of quality: when quality is high, the agency problem becomes
less severe. This implies that, relative to a static environment, the regulator has an additional
incentive to enhance quality, namely to reduce future informational rents. In particular, she
will take advantage of a high quality shock to demand a higher eﬀort from the current
agent. As a result of this, there may be over-provision of quality relative to the symmetric
information environment, typically following a sequence of high quality shocks. Sharper
predictions are derived using a linear-quadratic specification of the model. It is shown that,
while private information leads to a lower average growth rate of quality, it also increases the
variance of quality. In the long run, the range of possible public good qualities is larger under
asymmetric information than under symmetric information, and thus both over-provision and
under-provision of quality can persist asymptotically.
We next turn to the case where the regulator delegates the management of quality to
a single agent, which raises the issue of dynamic incentives. To deliver analytical results,
we consider a two-period model. In each period, the agent privately learns the realization
of the quality shock, and then chooses his eﬀort. In line with the basic model, we assume
that the agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. We mainly
focus on the full commitment case, in which both the regulator and the agent can commit to
a long-term contract, subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Our
main findings are as follows. First, the optimal long-term contract exhibits memory: the
level of distortions in the second period depends on the type of the agent in the first period.
With a sequence of agents, by contrast, distortions in the second period would depend on the
past only through the level of quality inherited from the first period. Second, the regulator
may find it optimal to induce a constant quality of service in the first period, irrespective
of the realized quality shock. The reason for this pooling outcome is that increasing the
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quality produced following a low quality shock in the first period allows to reduce the second
period informational rent. This directly benefits the regulator, and also makes misreporting
by the agent in case of a high quality shock less attractive from the first period perspective,
thus decreasing the cost of dynamic incentives. Screening is then achieved using only current
transfers and continuation rents: following a high quality shock, the agent receives a low
transfer in the first period in exchange for a high continuation rent, while the reverse is true
following a low quality shock. In these circumstances, there is over-provision of first period
quality following both a high and a low quality shock. Using the linear-quadratic specification
of the model, we show that pooling over first period quality typically occurs when the future
is important relative to the present, that is, when quality depreciates slowly and the discount
factor is high. Our final result compares the model with a single agent and full commitment
to the model with a sequence of agents, specialized to the two-period case. A natural question
is whether it is better for the regulator to hire a single agent, or to contract with a sequence
of agents. The benefit of hiring a single agent is that the regulator can directly condition his
continuation rent on his first period performance, as in the standard repeated moral hazard
problem (Rogerson (1985)). The cost, by contrast, is that the agent correctly anticipates the
impact of his first period actions on his future utility, thus making the first period incentive
compatibility constraint more stringent than with a sequence of agents. Our main result
is that, for small levels of asymmetric information, the first eﬀect dominates, so that it is
optimal for the regulator to hire a single agent.
This paper is in line with works that extend the analysis of incentives in regulation to
a dynamic framework (Baron and Besanko (1984), Laﬀont and Tirole (1988, 1990), Lewis
and Sappington (1997)). In these papers, the source of the dynamics is that the regulated
firm’s costs are correlated across periods, so that the regulator progressively learns about the
eﬃciency of the firm. Instead of this, the intertemporal link stressed in this paper is purely
physical. This is similar to Lewis and Yildirim (2002), who study the optimal regulation of a
firm who learns to use cost-reducing innovations over time.2 They show that a light-handed
regulation may encourage innovation, by allowing the firm to earn greater informational
rents while providing greater service. Moreover, innovation may occur even in the absence of
long-term agreements, provided private information is renewed in each period. Their model
diﬀers from ours in some important respects. First, private information in our model takes the
form of quality shocks that directly aﬀect future consumer surplus and thus have permanent
eﬀects, while it is embedded in their model in a transitory cost. Next, while Lewis and
Yildirim (2002) only allow for sequences of spot contracts, we analyze the opposite case in
which the regulator can commit to a long-term contract, subject to the constraint that the
agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section 3,
we analyze the dynamics of quality under symmetric and asymmetric information when the
regulator contracts with a sequence of short-lived agents. In Section 4, we consider the case
of a single long-lived agent. Section 5 concludes.
2See also Gaudet, Lasserre and Van Long (1997) and Ga¨rtner (2004) for related models. Gaudet, Lasserre
and Van Long (1995) also consider a dynamic contracting model with a physical state variable. In a context
of nonrenewable natural resource exploitation, they analyze how the dynamic relationship between the owner
and the manager of a mine is aﬀected by the level of reserves.
3We briefly consider the case of short-term contracts in Subsection 4.4. The main insight is that the absence
of commitment generates a ratchet eﬀect: an agent experiencing a high quality shock today anticipates that,
as a result of this, quality tomorrow will be higher, which in turn leads to lower continuation rents.
3
2. The Basic Model
Our model departs in two ways from standard regulation models such as those studied by
Baron and Myerson (1982) or Laﬀont and Tirole (1986). First, we consider a multi-period
environment. Second, we assume that there exists a physical state variable that dynamically
links periods to each other. This state variable is interpreted as the quality of a public good
or service, such as a road or electricity network.
The basic model focuses on the dynamics of quality, leaving aside the complex issues
related to the dynamic provision of incentives which are examined in Section 4. For this
purpose, we consider a benevolent regulator who delegates the management of the quality
of the public good to a sequence of agents, one for each period. The per-period consumer
surplus generated by a public good of quality q ≥ 0 is denoted S(q). The function S is
bounded, continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
The quality of the public good evolves over time as a function of the agents’ eﬀort to
maintain it and of exogenous quality shocks. Specifically, if the quality of the public good at
date t = 0, 1, . . . is qt, then its quality at date t+ 1 is:
qt+1 = δqt + et + θt, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation factor, et is the maintenance eﬀort exerted by the date t
agent, and θt is the date t quality shock. The parameter δ measures the extent to which
maintenance eﬀorts and quality shocks have durable eﬀects. The quality shocks {θt}∞t=0
are independently and identically distributed across periods, with support {θ, θ} such that
θ > θ ≥ 0, and we let ∆θ = θ − θ. For any date t = 0, 1, . . . , we denote by ν ∈ (0, 1) the
probability that θt = θ, and we let Eθ = E[θt] and Varθ = Var[θt].
An agent exerting a maintenance eﬀort e incurs a disutility ψ(e) in monetary units. The
function ψ is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex over R+, and
satisfies ψ(0) = ψ0(0) = 0. It is analytically convenient to extend the function ψ to the whole
real line by setting ψ = 0 over R−. To guarantee that the regulator’s objective function is
concave, we also assume that ψ has a convex derivative over R+.
Agents are compensated for their eﬀorts by monetary transfers. Given eﬀort level et and
monetary transfer ut, the date t agent’s overall utility is then:
Ut = ut − ψ(et). (2)
Each agent’s outside opportunity is normalized to zero. In addition, we assume that, to
accept working for the regulator, each agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state
of nature. An interpretation is that agents have infinite risk aversion below zero wealth (see
for instance Laﬀont and Martimort (2005, §3.5)).
As in Laﬀont and Tirole (1986), distortionary taxation inflicts a disutility $(1 + λ) on
consumers in order to levy $1 for the state, where λ > 0 is the shadow cost of public funds.
Hence, the date t net consumer surplus is S(qt)− (1+λ)ut, so that by (2), the corresponding
utilitarian social welfare is:
S(qt)− (1 + λ)ut + ut − ψ(et) = S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(et)− λUt. (3)
The regulator is far-sighted and discounts future payoﬀs with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
By (3), the expected discounted social welfare at date zero is thus equal to:
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt[S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(et)− λUt]
#
. (4)
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We assume throughout that quality is verifiable, so that the regulator can reward or punish
the agents directly as a function of quality improvements. By (1), this means that, at each
date, the sum of the agent’s eﬀort and of the quality shock is verifiable. Under symmetric
information, eﬀorts and shocks are themselves verifiable. Under asymmetric information,
however, neither eﬀorts nor shocks are verifiable, as in Lewis and Sappington (1991), while
the shocks are privately observed by the agents.4
3. Regulating Quality with a Sequence of Agents
3.1. Regulation under Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, we consider the symmetric information situation in which not only quality
improvements, but also the extent to which these can be attributed to agents’ eﬀorts or to
quality shocks are verifiable variables. As a result of this, regulatory contracts can be directly
made contingent on agents’ eﬀorts. The existence of a shadow cost of public funds implies
that agents receive no rent at the optimum, that is ut = ψ(et) for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1)—(2)
and (4), the regulator’s problem is then to find a sequence of quality levels {qt}∞t=1, where
each qt is contingent on the history of shocks (θ0, . . . , θt−1) up to date t, that solves:
V1(q0) = sup
(
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt[S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(qt+1 − δqt − θt)]
#)
,
given any initial quality level q0. This is a standard dynamic programming problem that can
be tackled by usual techniques. The symmetric information social value function V1 : R+ → R
is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation:
V1(q) = max
(e,q,e,q)
©
S(q)− ν(1 + λ)ψ(e)− (1− ν)(1 + λ)ψ(e) + νβV1(q) + (1− ν)βV1(q)
ª
, (5)
subject to the state transition constraints:
q = δq + e+ θ, (6)
q = δq + e+ θ, (7)
and the feasibility constraints:
q ≥ 0, (8)
q ≥ 0. (9)
Standard considerations (see for instance Stokey and Lucas (1989)) yield our first result.
Lemma 1. The symmetric information social value function V1 is bounded, continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
An implication of ψ0(0) = 0 is that it is always optimal for the regulator to induce strictly
positive eﬀort on the part of the current agent, no matter the current level of quality or the
4This modelling assumption is naturally reminiscent of Laﬀont and Tirole’s (1986) regulation model.
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current quality shock. That is, the feasibility constraints (8)—(9) are never binding. Denote
by e1(q), q1(q), e1(q), q1(q) the optimal choices in (5), which are uniquely determined. Then
the first-order conditions for (5) read as:
βV 01(q1(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q1(q)− δq − θ), (10)
βV 01(q1(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q
1
(q)− δq − θ). (11)
Since V1 is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R+, it follows from (10)—(11) that
q1(q) > q1(q): for a given level of public good quality, a high quality shock today leads to
a higher quality tomorrow than a low quality shock. Along with (6)—(7), (10)—(11) further
imply that e1(q) < e1(q): an agent facing a high quality shock exerts less eﬀort than one
facing a low quality shock, and therefore receives a lower transfer. Note that, as a result of
this, −(1 + λ)ψ(e1(q)) + βV1(q1(q)) > −(1 + λ)ψ(e1(q)) + βV1(q1(q)), so that the regulator
benefits from a high quality shock.
Using again the strict concavity of V1 and the strict convexity of ψ over R+, it is easy to
check from (10)—(11) that the mappings q1 and q1 are strictly increasing, while the mappings
e1 and e1 are strictly decreasing. Since ψ0(0) = 0 and limq→∞ q1(q) = limq→∞ q1(q) =∞ by
(6)—(7), and since V1 is bounded, a further implication of (10)—(11) is that limq→∞ e1(q) =
limq→∞ e1(q) = 0. These properties reflect the fact that the agents’ maintenance eﬀorts
become less important from the regulator’s viewpoint as quality improves. As a result of
this, limq→∞ V1(q) = limq→∞
S(q)
1−β .
3.2. Regulation under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the case in which neither agents’ eﬀorts nor quality shocks are verifiable.
An asymmetry of information then arises because, once in charge, agents become privately
informed of the current quality shock. Since they must receive a non-negative utility in each
state, eliciting this information from them is socially costly.5 The task of the regulator is to
design appropriate incentive schemes to overcome this hidden information problem and the
resulting moral hazard problem.
An incentive contract between the regulator and the date t agent specifies a transfer-
quality pair for each realization of the date t quality shock, which will be henceforth referred
to as the date t agent’s type. For a given level of public good quality q, a contract is thus a
4-tuple (u, q, u, q). Incentive compatibility requires that:
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ u− ψ(q − δq − θ), (12)
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ u− ψ(q − δq − θ). (13)
Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state, an incentive feasible contract
must also satisfy the following participation constraints:
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ 0, (14)
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ 0. (15)
5In the absence of such an ex-post participation constraint, the regulator could achieve the symmetric
information outcome through appropriate ex-ante contracting (D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979)).
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It is easy to check that the optimal contract under symmetric information does not satisfy
the incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent. As usual with this type of models, the
incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent and the participation constraint (15) of the
low type agent together imply the participation constraint (14) of the high type agent. To
maximize the expected discounted social welfare, we shall momentarily neglect the incentive
constraint (13) of the low type agent, and later check that the solution thus obtained satisfies
this constraint.
Denote by U(q) = u−ψ(q−δq−θ) and U(q) = u−ψ(q−δq−θ) the rents left to the agent
under the contract (u, q, u, q), given current quality q. The participation constraint (15) of
the low type agent can be rewritten as:
U(q) ≥ 0, (16)
while the incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent can be rewritten as:
U(q) ≥ U(q) + Φ(q, q), (17)
where the function Φ is defined by:
Φ(q, q) = ψ(q − δq − θ)− ψ(q − δq − θ). (18)
Intuitively, Φ(q, q) is the informational rent that must be left to the high type agent when the
low type agent improves quality from q to q. Since ψ is convex, Φ(q, ·) is increasing for any
value of q, while Φ(·, q) is decreasing for any value of q.6 Moreover, since ψ0 is convex, Φ(q, ·)
is convex for any value of q, and Φ(·, q) is convex for any value of q. These properties will
ensure that the regulator’s objective function is concave, and that the social value function
is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Since leaving rents to the agent is socially costly, it will be optimal to let (16)—(17) be
binding. That is, one will have:
Ut = Et[Φ(qt, qt+1) |θt = θ]1{θt=θ} (19)
for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1), (4) and (19), the regulator’s problem is then to find a sequence of
quality levels {qt}∞t=1, where each qt is contingent on the history of shocks (θ0, . . . , θt−1) up
to date t, that solves:
V2(q0) = sup
(
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt
∙
S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(qt+1 − δqt − θt)−
λν
1− ν Φ(qt, qt+1)1{θt=θ}
¸#)
,
given any initial quality level q0. In analogy with (5), the asymmetric information social
value function V2 : R+ → R is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation:
V2(q) = max
(e,q,e,q)
©
S(q)− ν(1 + λ)ψ(e)− (1− ν)(1 + λ)ψ(e)− λνΦ(q, q)
(20)
+ νβV2(q) + (1− ν)βV2(q)
ª
,
subject to constraints (6)—(9). The following result parallels Lemma 1.
6However, for q < δq + θ, these functions are constant and equal to zero.
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Lemma 2. The asymmetric information social value function V2 is bounded, continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
As in the symmetric information benchmark, the condition ψ0(0) = 0 implies that the
feasibility constraints (8)—(9) are never binding: it is always optimal for the regulator to
induce strictly positive eﬀort on the part of the current agent, no matter his type or the
current level of quality. Denote by e2(q), q2(q), e2(q), q2(q) the optimal choices in (20),
which are uniquely determined. Then the first-order conditions for (20) read as:
βV 02(q2(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q2(q)− δq − θ), (21)
βV 02(q2(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q
2
(q)− δq − θ) + λν
1− ν Φ2(q, q2(q)). (22)
Since V2 is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R+, and since Φ(q, ·) is convex, it follows
from (21)—(22) that q2(q) > q2(q). This in turn implies that the neglected constraint (13) is
satisfied by our candidate solution. Indeed, because (16)—(17) are binding, (13) is equivalent
to Φ(q, q2(q)) ≥ Φ(q, q2(q)), which holds as Φ(q, ·) is increasing. Because of the second
term on the right-hand side of (22), which corresponds to the distortion due to asymmetric
information, the comparison between the eﬀort levels e2(q) and e2(q) is ambiguous, unlike in
the symmetric information benchmark.
Using again the strict concavity of V2 and the strict convexity of ψ over R+, together
with the convexity of ψ0 and the definition (18) of Φ, it is easy to check from (21)—(22)
that the mappings q2 and q2 are strictly increasing, while the mappings e2 and e2 are strictly
decreasing. The strict convexity of ψ over R+, along with the monotonicity of e2, also implies
that the informational rent of a high type agent,
Φ(q, q
2
(q)) = ψ(e2(q))− ψ(e2(q)−∆θ), (23)
is a strictly decreasing function of public good quality q. It follows from (21)—(22) that,
as in the symmetric information benchmark, limq→∞ e2(q) = limq→∞ e2(q) = 0. By (23),
this implies that the informational rent of the high type agent vanishes as quality gets large,
limq→∞Φ(q, q2(q)) = 0. The intuition for this result is that when quality improves, it becomes
less important for the regulator to incite the low type agent to exert eﬀort. In particular,
limq→∞ V2(q) = limq→∞
S(q)
1−β as in the symmetric information benchmark.
Remark. Using the Envelope Theorem for (5) and (20), it is easy to check that both V 01 and
V 02 are strictly greater than S0. It follows that, in both regulatory contexts, the regulator
induces a higher quality service than in the corresponding one-period version of the model.7
This reflects that, because quality is durable in our model, the benefits of producing a higher
quality today arise directly through an increase of future consumer surpluses, and, indirectly,
through a reduced cost of supplying quality in the future.
3.3. Comparing the Two Regulatory Environments
A key insight of our analysis is that the social value of public good quality depends on
the regulatory environment. We argue in this section that, as a result of this, asymmetric
7This result is in line with Lewis and Yildirim (2002, Proposition 3(i)).
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information typically leads to distortions in both types of agents’ maintenance eﬀorts relative
to their symmetric information levels. To establish this point, we first present some general
analytical results, and then examine a linear-quadratic specification of the model.
3.3.1. General Results
To contrast the outcomes of the regulation game under symmetric and under asymmetric
information, it is helpful to compare the social value functions V1 and V2. Formally, the only
diﬀerence between the Bellman equations (5) and (20) that implicitly define V1 and V2 lies
in the informational rent λνΦ(q, q) that appears on the right-hand side of (20). As observed
above, this rent is a decreasing function of the current public good quality level q. This
suggests that under asymmetric information, an additional incentive to increase public good
quality is to reduce future informational rents. Accordingly, the marginal social value of
quality is strictly higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
as shown by the following result.
Proposition 1. For any q > 0, V 02(q) > V 01(q).
Along with (10) and (21), Proposition 1 implies that q2(q) > q1(q) for any q > 0. That
is, for a given level of public good quality q > 0, and conditional on a high quality shock
occurring, the regulator induces more eﬀort from the agent under asymmetric information
than under symmetric information, e2(q) > e1(q). The intuition is straightforward: given a
high quality shock, the marginal cost of eﬀort is the same in both regulatory environments,
while by Proposition 1, the marginal benefit of eﬀort is higher under asymmetric information.
In line with the dynamic rent extraction eﬀect outlined above, the regulator thus takes
advantage of facing a high type agent today to build better quality for tomorrow. It should be
noted that this over-provision of quality contrasts with the prediction of a one-period model,
in which high type agents would optimally exert the same level of eﬀort under symmetric
information as under asymmetric information. Because of the additional distortion term on
the right-hand side of (22), it is not possible in general to rank the quality levels q
1
(q) and q
2
(q)
conditional on a low shock to quality. The intuition is that asymmetric information raises
both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort given a low quality shock.
A robust prediction of our model is however that if suﬃciently many high quality shocks
occur, asymmetric information will lead to over-provision of public good quality relative to
the symmetric information benchmark.
The diﬀerences between the two regulatory environments do not disappear in the long
run, as can be shown by studying the asymptotic distribution of quality. Specifically, let
P1 and P2 be the probability transition functions over quality levels respectively induced by
(10)—(11) and (21)—(22). That is, for each i = 1, 2, and for any q ≥ 0, Pi(q, ·) is the law
of a random variable that takes the value qi(q) with probability ν, and the value qi(q) with
probability 1− ν. Then the following holds.
Proposition 2. P1 and P2 have unique invariant probability measures μ1 and μ2 with
compact supports suppμ1 and suppμ2 such that max suppμ2 > max suppμ1.
For any initial quality level q0, the distribution of quality will converge weakly to μ1 or
μ2 depending on the regulatory environment. Since the upper bound of the support of the
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asymptotic distribution of quality is strictly larger under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information, one will in the long run observe high quality levels in the former case
that cannot be achieved in the latter case. Therefore over-provision of public good quality
can persist in the long run under asymmetric information.
3.3.2. The Linear-Quadratic Case
To obtain sharper predictions, we consider a special case of our model, in which the underlying
surplus and cost functions are quadratic,
S(q) = aq − b
2
q2, (24)
ψ(e) =
c
2
max{e, 0}2, (25)
for some strictly positive parameters a, b and c. It should be noted that the surplus function
S defined by (24) makes sense only as long q < ab . Along standard lines (Stokey and Lucas
(1989, §4.4)), we first solve the Bellman equations (5) and (20) without taking into account
this restriction. We then check under which conditions and over which ranges the resulting
analytical solutions are economically meaningful. The appropriate parameter restrictions
amount to make θ and ∆θ close enough to zero, see the Appendix for a precise statement.
The linear-quadratic specification (24)—(25) ensures that the social value functions V1 and
V2 are themselves quadratic over the relevant ranges, that is, for each i = 1, 2,
Vi(q) = Aiq −
Bi
2
q2 + Ci, (26)
for some strictly positive parameters Ai, Bi and Ci, while the optimal policy functions q1,
q
1
, q2 and q2 are linear over the relevant ranges,
q1(q) =
βA1 + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB1 + c(1 + λ)
, (27)
q
1
(q) =
βA1 + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB1 + c(1 + λ)
, (28)
q2(q) =
βA2 + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB2 + c(1 + λ)
, (29)
q
2
(q) =
βA2 − λν1−ν c∆θ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB2 + c(1 + λ)
. (30)
To determine the optimal policy functions, what matters are the values of A1, B1, A2 and
B2. These are easily obtained by inserting the policy functions (27)—(28) and (29)—(30) into
the Bellman equations (5) and (20) and then using (26) to identify terms. An immediate
result is that the coeﬃcients B1 and B2 coincide. This reflects the property that, in the
linear-quadratic specification, and over the relevant range, the informational rent Φ(q, q) is a
linear function of (q, q),
Φ(q, q) = c∆θ
µ
q − δq − θ + θ
2
¶
. (31)
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It should be noted that, since the marginal social value of quality is higher under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information, A2 > A1.
An immediate implication of (27)—(30) is that asymmetric information increases the wedge
between qualities following a high and a low quality shock, q2(q)−q2(q) > q1(q)−q1(q). Our
next result strengthens this insight.
Proposition 3. Over the relevant range, the spread of public good qualities is larger under
asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
q2(q) > q1(q) > q1(q) > q2(q). (32)
The intuition for this result can be grasped by comparing the objective functions of the
regulator in (5) and (20). Under symmetric information, the marginal value of date t + 1
quality is the same following a high or a low quality shock, namely β(A1 − Bqt+1). By
contrast, under asymmetric information, the need to concede an informational rent to high
type agents introduces a wedge between the marginal value of quality following a high quality
shock, β(A2−Bqt+1), and the marginal value of quality following a low quality shock, net of
the incentive cost, β(A2 −Bqt+1)− λν1−ν c∆θ. It turns out that:
βA1 < βA2 < βA1 +
λν
1− ν c∆θ,
so that the higher marginal social benefit of quality due to asymmetric information does not
fully oﬀset the incentive cost given a low quality shock. As shown by (32), this simultaneously
leads to over-provision of quality following a high quality shock, q2(q) > q1(q), and to under-
provision of quality following a low quality shock, q
1
(q) > q
2
(q). While the first eﬀect reflects
a dynamic rent extraction motive, as discussed in Subsection 3.3.1, the second eﬀect reflects
a static rent extraction motive: the regulator induces less maintenance eﬀort from a low
type agent in order to reduce the rent she would have to leave today to a high type agent.
Proposition 3 shows that this static rent extraction eﬀect dominates the dynamic eﬀect. As
can be checked from (29)—(30), this may cause a high type agent to exert more eﬀort than
a low type agent given the same current level of quality, thus reversing the prediction of the
symmetric information benchmark.
In light of these results, it is natural to investigate which of the static and the dynamic rent
extraction motives dominates from an ex-ante perspective. To this end, we examine the time-
series properties of public good quality under the two regulatory regimes. Denote by {q1,t}∞t=0
and {q2,t}∞t=0 the stochastic processes of quality under symmetric and asymmetric information
respectively. Provided initial quality is low, these processes will remain in the appropriate
ranges over which our analytical solutions to (5) and (20) are economically meaningful. One
has the following result.
Proposition 4. Public good quality grows at a lower expected rate under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information,
E [q1,t+1 |q1,t = q] > E [q2,t+1 |q2,t = q], (33)
while the variance of public good quality growth is higher under asymmetric information than
under symmetric information,
Var [q2,t+1 |q2,t = q] > Var [q1,t+1 |q1,t = q]. (34)
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From an ex-ante perspective, the static rent extraction motive therefore dominates the
dynamic rent extraction motive, and asymmetric information leads to on average lower and
more volatile quality growth. These properties carry over to the long run. For each i = 1, 2,
let Eμi =
R
q dμi(q) and Varμi =
R
(q−Eμi)2 dμi(q) be the expectation and variance of quality
under the invariant measure μi. Weak convergence of the distribution of quality to μi ensures
that limt→∞ E [qi,t] = Eμi and limt→∞Var [qi,t] = Varμi , no matter the initial quality level q0.
The following result provides the long run analogues of (33) and (34).
Proposition 5. In the long run, public good quality is on average lower under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information,
Eμ1 > Eμ2 , (35)
while its variance is higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
Varμ2 > Varμ1 . (36)
4. Regulating Quality with a Single Agent
In this section, we suppose that there is a single agent the regulator can contract with over
time. In contrast with the regulatory environments studied in Section 3, the regulator can
now provide dynamic incentives to exert eﬀort. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
contractual relationship lasts only two periods: the agent exerts eﬀort at dates 0 and 1 to
provide public good quality at dates 1 and 2. The model remains otherwise the same, except
that we no longer require the discount factor β to be smaller than one.8 Our setup therefore
diﬀers in two ways from the dynamic regulation models previously studied in the literature
(Baron and Besanko (1984), Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985), Laﬀont and Tirole (1988,
1990), Lewis and Sappington (1997)). First, the only link between periods is physical and
not informational, as quality shocks are independently distributed across periods. Second,
as in the basic model, only contracts that leave the agent with a non-negative utility at each
date and in each state can be enforced.9
4.1. Regulation under Symmetric Information
The symmetric information benchmark does not diﬀer significantly from that derived in
Subsection 3.1, except for the finite horizon. In each period, the agent receives no rent at
the optimum, that is ut = ψ(et) for each t = 0, 1. For each realization (θ0, θ1) of the agent’s
types at dates 0 and 1, we denote by q1,1(θ0), q1,2(θ0, θ1) the optimal contingent public good
quality levels at dates 1 and 2, and by e1,0(θ0) and e1,1(θ0, θ1) the corresponding optimal
contingent eﬀort levels at dates 0 and 1. Then, using the Envelope Theorem, the first-order
conditions for the regulator’s problem can be compactly written as follows:
βS0(q1,2(θ0, θ1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(e1,1(θ0, θ1)), (37)
βS0(q1,1(θ0)) + βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(e1,1(θ0, θ1)) |θ0
¤
= (1 + λ)ψ0(e1,0(θ0)) (38)
8A large discount factor may reflect the fact that the accounting period for future production stages exceeds
that for the current production stage, or that later projects are operated on a larger scale than early projects.
9Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, §8.1.3) study how this constraint aﬀects the outcome of a repeated agency
model in which the link between periods is purely informational.
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where q1,1(θ0) = δq0 + e1,0(θ0) + θ0 and q1,2(θ0, θ1) = δq1,1(θ0) + e1,1(θ0, θ1) + θ1 for each
(θ0, θ1) ∈ {θ, θ}2. The date 1 first-order condition (37) is self-explanatory. The second term
on the left-hand side of the date 0 first-order condition (38) reflects the dynamic benefit of
date 0 maintenance eﬀorts, which is to reduce the cost of enhancing quality at date 1.
Remark. As in the stationary setting of Subsection 3.1, the optimal symmetric information
quality provision depends at each date only on the current level of quality, as well as on the
current quality shock. We denote accordingly by Q1,1 and Q1,1 the optimal policy functions
describing how date 0 quality is mapped into date 1 quality depending of the realization of the
date 0 quality shock. Similarly, Q1,2 and Q1,2 denote the optimal policy functions describing
how date 1 quality is mapped into date 2 quality depending of the realization of the date 1
quality shock.
4.2. Regulation under Asymmetric Information: Full Commitment
We now turn to the case where neither the agent’s eﬀorts nor the quality shocks are verifiable,
but long-term regulatory contracts can be perfectly enforced, subject to the constraint that
the agent receives a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. Because of full
commitment, the Revelation Principle applies. For each pair of reports (θˆ0, θˆ1) ∈ {θ, θ}2 by
the agent, we denote by u2,0(θˆ0), u2,1(θˆ0, θˆ1) the optimal contingent transfer levels at dates 0
and 1, and by q2,1(θˆ0), q2,2(θˆ0, θˆ1) the optimal contingent quality levels at dates 1 and 2.10
4.2.1. Preliminaries
We solve for the optimal contract in two steps. Consider first the date 1 contract. Since the
regulator and the agent are risk-neutral and discount future utility at the same rate, there is
no loss of generality in assuming that, whenever θ1 = θ, the agent receives no rent at date 1
no matter his first period report θˆ0. Therefore,
u2,1(θˆ0, θ) = ψ(q2,2(θˆ0, θ)− δq2,1(θˆ0)− θ)
for each θˆ0 ∈ {θ, θ}. Standard considerations then imply that, given a date 0 report θˆ0, the
rent that the agent receives at date 1 whenever θ1 = θ is given by Φ(q2,1(θˆ0), q2,2(θˆ0, θ)). In
turn, incentive compatibility at date 0 requires that:
u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
(39)
≥ u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)),
u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
(40)
≥ u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)).
10We hereby restrict the analysis to deterministic mechanisms. Since the objective function of the regulator
is not necessarily concave, she may increase social welfare by using stochastic mechanisms (see Laﬀont and
Martimort (2002, §2.13)). Such mechanisms are however diﬃcult to implement in practice, which is why we
chose to rule them out. This problem does not arise in the linear-quadratic specification, because the function
Φ is then linear over the relevant range, see (31).
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Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state, the optimal
contract must also satisfy the following date 0 participation constraints:
u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) ≥ 0, (41)
u2,0(θ)− ψ(q2,1(θ)− δq0 − θ) ≥ 0. (42)
It will be convenient to define the equilibrium levels of eﬀort as e2,0(θ0) = q2,1(θ0)− δq0 − θ0
and e2,1(θ0, θ1) = q2,2(θ0, θ1)− δq2,1(θ0)− θ1 for each (θ0, θ1) ∈ {θ, θ}2.
It is not a priori clear which of the constraints (39)—(40) and (41)—(42) are binding at the
optimum. This is because we require the optimal contract to satisfy not only intertemporal
participation constraints, but also the more restrictive constraints (41)—(42) on date 0 utilities.
As a result of this, one cannot for instance argue that the incentive constraint of the high type
agent and the participation constraint of the low type agent together imply the participation
constraint of the high type agent, as would be the case in a standard model. Still, the
following result holds.
Proposition 6. In the optimal long-term contract, q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ), and constraints (39)
and (42) are binding. Therefore, the date 0 rent of a high type agent is given by:
U2,0(θ) = Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
. (43)
Equation (43) has a natural interpretation: the first term on the right-hand side is a
standard static informational rent, while the second term represents the expected discounted
gain in terms of date 1 rents from pretending to be a low type agent rather than a high type
agent at date 0.
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. Suppose it were optimal to leave a low type
agent a strictly positive rent at date 0. One can verify that, in analogy with (43), this rent
must be given by:
−Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
. (44)
The incentive for a low type agent to misrepresent his type at date 0 only comes from the
bracketed term in (44), which represents the date 1 rent diﬀerential. Since the function Φ is
decreasing in its first argument and q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ), this term can be strictly positive only
if q2,2(θ, θ) is significantly larger than q2,2(θ, θ). Given (44), the total expected discounted
rents at date 0 amount to:
(1− ν)
©
−Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤ª
+ ν2βΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) + ν(1− ν)βΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) (45)
= − (1− ν)Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)).
Since (45) is independent of q2,2(θ, θ) and (42) is assumed slack, the optimal determination
of q2,2(θ, θ) involves no rent-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. By contrast, since (45) is strictly increasing
in q2,2(θ, θ), it is optimal to distort q2,2(θ, θ) downward. This in turn amplifies the reduction
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of date 1 rent due to the fact that q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ). As is easy to check, this implies that the
bracketed term in (44) is strictly negative, reflecting that a low type agent has no incentive
to misrepresent his type at date 0. As a result of this, he cannot earn a strictly positive rent
at date 0, contrary to the assumption.
Proposition 6 allows us to simplify the regulator’s problem as follows. Given (43), the
total expected discounted rents at date 0 amount to:
ν
©
Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤ª
+ ν2βΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) + ν(1− ν)βΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) (46)
= νΦ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)).
Using the fact that (39) and (42) are binding at the optimum, it is easy to see that (40) is
equivalent to the following monotonicity constraint:
q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ), (47)
while, given (43), (41) can be rewritten as:
Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
≥ 0. (48)
It thus follows from (46) that, for a given value of q0, the pair of functions (q2,1, q2,2) solves:
max
(q˜1,q˜2)
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜1(θ0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q˜1(θ0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq˜1(θ0)− θ1) + β2S(q˜2(θ0, θ1))] (49)
− λνΦ(q0, q2,1(θ))− λνβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))},
subject to the constraint that (47)—(48) hold at the optimum. While constraints (39) and
(42) are necessarily binding in the optimal long-term contract, one cannot decide a priori on
the status of constraints (47)—(48). Indeed, pooling over date 1 quality may occur, so that
(40) or equivalently (47) may be binding. Furthermore, it is unclear that a high type agent
receives a strictly positive rent at date 0, and thus that (41) or equivalently (48) are slack.
We say that we are in the regular case when the parameter values are such that this latter
property holds.
4.2.2. Date 2 Quality Levels
In this subsection, we investigate date 2 quality levels. Let us first assume for simplicity
that the regular case obtains, so that constraint (48) can be neglected. It then follows that
there is no term of the form Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) in the program (47)—(49) that determines q2,2.
This reflects that, while increasing the date 1 rent Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) by ε > 0 has a direct
expected discounted cost λν2βε for the regulator, it also allows her to reduce the expected
cost λνU2,0(θ) of the date 0 rent by exactly the same amount, see (43). Thus the cost of
providing incentives at date 1 given that the agent had a high type at date 0 is already taken
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into account in the rent left by the regulator to this agent at date 0, and is therefore perfectly
internalized by her. By contrast, increasing the date 1 rent Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) by ε > 0 has a
direct expected discounted cost λν(1 − ν)βε at date 1, to which must be added an indirect
expected cost λν2βε at date 0 due to the increase of the date 0 rent U2,0(θ), see again (43).
This reflects that raising Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) makes a deviation more attractive for a high type
agent at date 0. It is then easy to characterize the optimal quality levels at date 2. Using
the notation of Subsection 4.1, one has:
q2,2(θ, θ) = Q1,2(q2,1(θ)), (50)
q2,2(θ, θ) = Q1,2(q2,1(θ)), (51)
q2,2(θ, θ) = Q1,2(q2,1(θ)), (52)
so that there are no distortions of date 2 quality given the date 1 quality levels if θ0 = θ or
θ1 = θ, while the date 2 quality if (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ) is distorted downward according to:
βS0(q2,2(θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ)− δq2,1(θ)− θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)). (53)
Note from (47)—(49) that (50)—(51) hold even if we are not in the regular case. Concerning
q2,2(θ, θ) and q2,2(θ, θ), the following general result holds.
Proposition 7. In the optimal long-term contract, the level of distortions at date 1 is strictly
higher following θ0 = θ than following θ0 = θ. In particular, q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ).
In analogy with the standard repeated moral hazard problem (Rogerson (1985)), the
optimal long-term contract therefore exhibits memory, in the sense that the level of distortions
at date 1 depends on the type of the agent at date 0. This is because we impose that the
agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. Thus, although the
date 1 contract is signed at date 0 under symmetric information about the date 1 quality
shock, the regulator cannot fully extract the agent’s expected date 1 rent at date 0, unlike
for instance in the Baron and Besanko (1984) regulation model with independent types.
4.2.3. Date 1 Quality Levels and Pooling
Having determined the optimal date 2 quality levels, one can move backward to date 1.
Without specifying further the model, however, it is not easy to characterize the date 1
properties of the optimal contract, and in particular to assess under which circumstances
(47) and (48) are binding. In this section, we focus on the monotonicity constraint (47), and
we determine under which circumstances pooling over date 1 quality may occur.
The reason for why this may arise at the optimum is that increasing date 1 quality
following θ0 = θ does not only aﬀect consumer surplus, but also the informational rents that
must be left to the agent. As shown by (46), these rents consist of two terms. The first term
is proportional to Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)), which is increasing in q2,1(θ). This reflects a standard static
rent extraction motive. By contrast, the second term is proportional to Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)),
which is decreasing in q2,1(θ). As in the multiple agent model of Section 3, this reflects a
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dynamic rent extraction motive. The logic is slightly diﬀerent, however. In the multiple agent
model, the regulator typically wanted to increase the quality produced by a high type agent at
date 0 only in order to decrease the rents that he had to concede at date 1, regardless of date
0 incentives. By contrast, in the single agent model, the regulator may want to increase the
quality produced by a low type agent at date 0 in order to reduce the date 1 rents following
a report θˆ0 = θ, and thus make a deviation less attractive for a high type agent at date 0.
The fact that, as discussed in Subsection 4.2.2, date 1 rents are treated asymmetrically by
the regulator, depending on the type of the agent at date 0, explains why this dynamic rent
extraction eﬀect now aﬀects the quality produced by a low type agent at date 0, and not
directly that produced by a high type agent.
Overall, pooling over date 1 quality takes place if the dynamic rent extraction motive
prevails, a situation that can intuitively arise only if the discount factor β and the depreciation
factor δ are high enough. This is confirmed by our next result.
Proposition 8. If q0 is close enough to zero, pooling over date 1 quality can occur in the
optimal long-term contract only if βδ > 1.
In order to show that pooling over date 1 quality can indeed occur in equilibrium in
the circumstances delineated in Proposition 7, we turn to the linear-quadratic specification
(24)—(25). As in the basic model, special care must be taken in specifying parameters for the
model such that the solution is economically meaningful. In particular, it turns out that for
date 1 quality levels to remain smaller than ab , the discount factor β cannot be too large for
a given value of δ. Specifically, it can be shown that if q0, θ and ∆θ are close enough to zero,
it must be the case that β < β(δ), where β(δ) is the positive solution to:
β2δ(1− δ)b
βb+ c(1 + λ)
= 1. (54)
Note that β(δ) goes to infinity when δ goes to one, and thus one can choose βδ to be greater
than one as required by Proposition 8. One then has the following result.11
Proposition 9. For any δ close enough to one, there exists a β(δ) ∈ (0,β(δ)) such that,
for any β ∈ [β(δ),β(δ)), and for any q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to zero, pooling over date 1
quality occurs in the optimal long-term contract and (48) is slack.
Pooling over date 1 quality distorts the allocation of resources relative to the symmetric
information benchmark. Consider the case of a high quality shock at date 0, and suppose
that we are in the regular case, as in Proposition 9. We know from (50) and (52) that, in
this case, there will be no distortions of date 2 quality levels given the date 1 quality level
q2,1(θ). In turn, q2,1(θ) satisfies the first-order condition:
βS0(q2,1(θ)) + βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(e2,1(θ, θ1))
¤
= (1 + λ)ψ0(e2,0(θ))−
ξ1
ν
, (55)
where ξ1 is the multiplier associated to (47). Using the notation of Subsection 4.1, it follows
from (38) and (55) that q2,1(θ) ≥ q1,1(θ), with a strict inequality if ξ1 > 0. Thus pooling
11This result hinges on the assumption that δ is close to one. One can show that, in the linear-quadratic
specification of the model, pooling actually requires such a high degree of quality durability. Specifically, if δ
is close enough to zero, then no pooling over date 1 qualities can occur in the optimal contract, even if β is
equal to its maximum admissible level β(δ). We refer to the Appendix for details.
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over date 1 quality leads to over-provision of date 1 quality when θ0 = θ, and a fortiori when
θ0 = θ, relative to the symmetric information benchmark.
Finally, it should be emphasized that pooling over date 1 quality does not prevent the
regulator from screening the agent’s type at date 0. Rather, screening is achieved through
date 0 transfers u2,0(θˆ0) and date 1 continuation rents Φ(q2,1(θˆ0), q2,2(θˆ0, θ)). Specifically, let
qp2,1 = q2,1(θ) = q2,1(θ). Then, one has:
u2,0(θ) = ψ(q
p
2,1 − δq0 − θ) + Φ(q0, q
p
2,1) + νβ
h
Φ(qp2,1, q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ))
i
= u2,0(θ) + νβ
h
Φ(qp2,1, q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ))
i
< u2,0(θ),
where we have used the fact that (39) and (42) are binding, and that q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) by
Proposition 7. At date 0, a high type agent therefore receives a lower transfer than a low type
agent, u2,0(θ) < u2,0(θ), in exchange for a higher date 1 continuation rent, Φ(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)) >
Φ(qp2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)). Note that q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) although q2,1(θ) = q2,1(θ). Thus, unlike in
the multiple agent model, date 1 quality does not constitute a suﬃcient statistic for the
continuation of the contractual relationship: while a high type and a low type agent having
delivered the same level of date 1 quality have the same preferences at date 1, they are
treated diﬀerently in the continuation contract. The reason of this apparent paradox is that
the regulator does not treat the date 1 rents of a former high type agent in the same way as
those of a former low type agent. This endogenously leads to a sorting condition that makes
it optimal for her to screen the agent at date 0, in spite of pooling over date 1 quality.
4.3. Single versus Multiple Agents
It is instructive to compare regulation with a single agent and with a sequence of agents. The
key diﬀerence between the two setups is that, when the regulator contracts with a single agent,
she is no longer constrained to use sequentially rational date 2 Markovian quality policies
contingent on date 1 quality and the agent’s date 1 type. To illustrate this point, suppose for
simplicity that the regular case obtains. Then, as shown by (52), the regulator commits to
an eﬃcient quality level when (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ), whereas she would find it optimal to distort
downward quality were she facing multiple agents in the same circumstances.12 Conversely,
as shown by (53), she commits to a higher level of distortions when (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ), reflecting
the cost of providing dynamic incentives.
Although general comparison results are hard to obtain, one can unambiguously rank
date 1 quality levels in the two regulatory environments. Specifically, let q2,1(q0) and q2,1(q0)
be the quality levels at date 1 following respectively a high and low quality shock at date 0
when there are multiple agents. Then the following holds.
Proposition 10. If the regular case obtains and no pooling over date 1 qualities occurs in
optimal long-term contract with a single agent, the spread of public good qualities at date 1
is wider with a sequence of agents than with a single agent,
q2,1(q0) > q2,1(θ) > q2,1(θ) > q2,1(q0). (56)
12The optimal distortion level is given by equation (84) in the Appendix, see footnote 14.
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This result reflects the diﬀerence in date 1 distortions that occur in the two regulatory
environments. With a sequence of agents, as in the basic model of Section 3, there is over-
provision of date 1 quality following a high quality shock at date 0. This is because the date
1 informational rent that has to be left when there is a further high quality shock at date 1 is
not internalized by the regulator, as opposed to when there is a single agent. Increasing date
1 quality allows the regulator to reduce this rent, which leads to the first half of (56). By
contrast, the date 1 distortions following a low quality shock at date 0 are larger with a single
agent than with a sequence of agents, reflecting the cost of making a deviation for a high
type agent less attractive at date 0. In turn, increasing date 1 quality allows the regulator to
alleviate this cost, which leads to the second half of (56).
A natural question is whether it is better from the regulator’s viewpoint to hire a single
agent or to contract with a sequence of agents.13 In our model, each option comes with costs
and benefits. On the one hand, by hiring a single agent, the regulator can directly condition
his date 1 compensation on his date 0 performance, while this occurs only indirectly through
date 1 quality when there is a sequence of agents. This in turn allows the regulator to
internalize some of the costs of providing incentives at date 1, as explained in Subsection
4.2.2. On the other hand, the fact that the same agent is rewarded over two periods raises
the cost of providing incentives at date 0, because the agent anticipates the impact of his date
0 actions on his date 1 utility. Which of these eﬀects prevails is a priori unclear. However,
for small but strictly positive levels of asymmetric information, it is better to hire a single
agent, as the following result indicates.
Proposition 11. Fix all parameters of the model except θ. When θ is close enough to θ,
the ex-ante social welfare is strictly higher in the optimal long-term contract with a single
agent than in the optimal contract with a sequence of agents.
The intuition for this result is that, when θ is close to θ, one can always replicate the
optimal contract with a sequence of agents in the environment with full commitment and
a single agent. To check that, one needs only to verify that the analogues of constraints
(39)—(42) are satisfied when one substitutes in the solution for the optimal contract with a
sequence of agents. The only constraint that turns out to matter is (39). Letting q
2,2
(q1) be
the optimal quality level at date 2 given a date 1 quality level q1 and a low quality shock at
date 1, this can be rewritten as:
Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)) ≥ νβ
h
Φ(q
2,1
(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))− Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))
i
. (57)
When θ is close to θ and thus ∆θ is close to zero, the left-hand side of (57) is of order ∆θ,
while the right-hand side of (57) is of order ∆θ[q2,1(q0)− q2,1(q0)]. When θ is close to θ, this
term is negligible relative to ∆θ as both optimal date 1 policy functions converge pointwise
13In our context, the answer to this question is not a priori obvious because quality physically links periods
together, and agents must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. By contrast, in Baron
and Besanko (1984), long-term contracts can be signed that do not need to satisfy this condition, and there
is no physical intertemporal link. When types are independent across periods, sequential contracting with
multiple agents is then suboptimal because it does not allow the regulator to extract the expected date 1
rent at date 0. This result still holds if, in addition, one modifies their model by imposing our restrictions
on utilities: in the absence of a physical intertemporal link, the optimal contract with a sequence of agents is
then simply the repetition of the optimal static contract, which can obviously be duplicated in a long-term
contract with a single agent.
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to a function q2,1 corresponding to the limit case where θ = θ. It follows that (57) is satisfied
for θ close enough to θ, which implies the result.
4.4. No Commitment and the Ratchet Eﬀect
Let us briefly consider the case where there is a single agent, but neither the regulator nor the
agent can commit to a long-term contract. At date 1, the regulator oﬀers the same contract
than with a sequence of agents. At date 0, and for an initial level of quality q0, a contract is
simply a 4-tuple (u0, q1, u0, q1). Incentive compatibility at date 0 requires that:
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q2,2(q1))
(58)
≥ u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q2,2(q1)),
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q2,2(q1))
(59)
≥ u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q2,2(q1)).
Because ψ is convex, an immediate implication of (58)—(59) is that q1 ≥ q1. In this context,
if a low type agent misrepresents his type at date 0, he will still contract with the regulator
at date 1 and earn a positive rent on average: a “take-the-money-and-run” strategy is not
profitable, reflecting the fact that types are independent across periods. This represents a key
diﬀerence between this setup and a standard dynamic adverse selection model with perfectly
correlated types (Laﬀont and Tirole (1988)).
Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state, an incentive feasible
contract must also satisfy the following date 0 participation constraints:
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) ≥ 0, (60)
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) ≥ 0. (61)
Given that, in analogy with the basic model, the date 1 rent is a decreasing function of date
1 quality, it is easy to check that (58) and (61) imply (60) provided that q1 ≥ q1. Adding
this as a constraint to the regulator’s problem, one can then solve for the optimal date 0
contract in a completely standard way. The incentive compatibility constraint (58) of the
high type agent is binding, as well as the participation constraint (61) of the low type agent.
Straightforward manipulations imply that the incentive compatibility constraint (59) of the
low type agent can be rewritten as Φ(q0, q1) ≥ Φ(q0, q1), which is satisfied when q1 ≥ q1.
Although the complications that usually arise in models of dynamic adverse selection are
absent in this model, the lack of commitment still generates a ratchet eﬀect. Indeed, since the
regulator cannot commit to a compensation scheme at date 1, a high type agent anticipates
at date 0 that, by revealing his type, he will reduce his date 1 rent, since:
Φ(q1, q2,2(q1)) ≤ Φ(q1, q2,2(q1)).
That is, the agent anticipates that being eﬃcient today will increase the level of quality
tomorrow and therefore jeopardize his continuation rent. The corresponding date 0 rent of a
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high type agent is therefore given by:
Φ(q0, q1) + νβ
h
Φ(q
1
, q
2,2
(q
1
))− Φ(q1, q2,2(q1))
i
.
To reduce this rent, it is typically optimal for the regulator to induce a pooling outcome at
date 0 when β is large.
It is straightforward to compare social welfare with a single agent and no commitment and
with a sequence of agents. Indeed, the optimal date 1 policies are the same in both problems,
while the incentive compatibility constraint at date 0 is more stringent with a single agent,
due to the ratchet eﬀect. Therefore, when no commitment is feasible, it is better from a
social viewpoint to contract with a sequence of agents rather than to hire a single agent.
This contrasts with the findings of Lewis and Yildirim (2002, Proposition 4), who show in a
learning-by-doing model that when supply costs decrease with past production, the regulator
will prefer dealing with a single supplier rather than relying on less durable franchises. The
reason is that, in their model, the regulated firm’s informational rents are higher when supply
costs falls and the regulator demands more service, while these rents are lower in our model
when public good quality increases.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explored the design of incentives for public good quality provision in a
dynamic regulation framework in which maintenance eﬀorts and quality shocks have long-
lasting eﬀects. We considered in turn two regulatory frameworks, one with a sequence of
short-term agents, and one with a single long-term agent. When the regulator contracts
with a sequence of agents, asymmetries of information can result in over-provision of quality
under optimal regulation, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction motive. This contrasts with the
standard prediction of a static model of quality provision. In the linear-quadratic example,
asymmetries of information lead to higher (lower) maintenance eﬀorts in the case of a high
(low) quality shock, which translates into more volatile quality growth than under symmetric
information. When the regulator hires a single agent to manage public good quality, over-
provision of quality can also occur, but through a diﬀerent mechanism: if quality depreciates
slowly and the discount factor is large, optimal regulation can lead to quality pooling, which
results in over-provision of quality irrespective of the realization of the quality shock. For
small levels of asymmetric information, the regulator prefers to hire a single agent rather than
to contract with a sequence of agents, provided they can commit to a long-term contract. By
contrast, when no such commitment is feasible, the durability of quality leads to a ratchet
eﬀect even though private information is recurring, and shorter franchises are beneficial from
a social point of view.
This paper abstracts from several important features of quality regulation, which should
be investigated in future work. We have considered a project of fixed size, implicitly focusing
on quality as the sole dimension of diﬀerentiation. It would be interesting to extend the
analysis to the case where consumers care both about the quantity and the quality of output,
in order to explore the trade-oﬀ between the level and the quality of service, as well as the
interaction between the regulated firm’s prices and changes in quality. Another meaningful
extension of the analysis would be to relax the assumption that quality is verifiable by allowing
only imperfect signals of quality to be ascertained in court.
Finally, the techniques and insights developed in this paper might be also applied to
21
the study of other dynamic agency relationships in which the cost of providing incentives
is aﬀected by an endogenous state variable as in our model. For instance, the owner of a
durable good such as a flat or a building might be concerned with the maintenance eﬀorts
exerted by the successive renters, while the latter may diﬀer with respect to the kind of use
they will make of the property–they may be for instance careful or careless. The state of
the property would then vary over time as a function of the successive renters’ types and
maintenance eﬀorts, while the value of the property would be endogenously determined by
the whole sequence of rental contracts oﬀered by the owner. As in our model, a succession of
careful renters may increase the state of the property over and above the first-best level. In
this context, it might be interesting to endogenize the sequence of renters’ types by studying
the incentives of diﬀerent types of renters to select properties of diﬀerent states, and the
impact of this self-selection mechanism on the value of property over time. These important
questions are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote by T1 and T2 the Bellman operators associated to (5) and (20)
respectively. The following lemma holds.
Lemma A.1. Let f1 and f2 be two real-valued functions over R+ that are both bounded, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable over R++. Then, if f 02 ≥ f 01 over R++,
(T2f2)
0 > (T1f1)0 over R++.
Proof. Standard considerations (see for instance Stokey and Lucas (1989, §4)) imply that T1f1 and
T2f2 are bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable over R++. The
condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that the optimal eﬀort levels remain strictly positive. Fix q > 0. The
first-order conditions corresponding to the program that defines (T1f1)(q) are:
βf 01(Q1(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(Q1(q)− δq − θ), (62)
βf 01(Q1(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(Q
1
(q)− δq − θ). (63)
By the Envelope Theorem,
(T1f1)
0(q) = S0(q) + νδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1(q)− δq − θ) + (1− ν)δ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1(q)− δq − θ).
Using (62)—(63), this can be rewritten as:
(T1f1)
0(q) = S0(q) + νβδf 01(Q1(q)) + (1− ν)βδf 01(Q1(q)). (64)
Similarly, the first-order conditions corresponding to the program that defines (T2f2)(q) are:
βf 02(Q2(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(Q2(q)− δq − θ), (65)
βf 02(Q2(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(Q
2
(q)− δq − θ) + λν
1− ν Φ2(q,Q2(q)). (66)
By the Envelope Theorem,
(T2f2)
0(q) = S0(q)+ νδ(1+λ)ψ0(Q2(q)− δq− θ)+ (1− ν)δ(1+λ)ψ0(Q2(q)− δq− θ)− νλΦ1(q,Q2(q)).
Using (65)—(66) together with Φ1 = −δΦ2, this can be rewritten as:
(T2f2)
0(q) = S0(q) + νβδf 02(Q2(q)) + (1− ν)βδf 02(Q2(q)). (67)
Using the fact that f1 and f2 are strictly concave, that ψ is strictly convex over R+ and that f 02 ≥ f 01,
one can check from (62) and (65) that f 02(Q2(q)) ≥ f 01(Q1(q)). Since Φ2(q,Q2(q)) > 0, it follows in a
similar way from (63) and (66) that f 02(Q2(q)) > f
0
1(Q1(q)). Therefore, by (64) and (67), one obtains
that (T2f2)
0(q) > (T1f1)0(q), which implies the result since q is arbitrarily chosen. ¤
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 1. The fact that T1 and T2 are contractions
with unique fixed points V1 and V2 over the space of bounded continuous functions over R+ ensures
that V1 = limn→∞ T
n
1 S and V2 = limn→∞ T
n
2 S pointwise over R+. Since V1 and V2 are finite, concave
and diﬀerentiable over R++, this implies that V 01 = limn→∞(Tn1 S)0 and V 02 = limn→∞(Tn2 S)0 pointwise
over R++ (Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.7)). By Lemma A.1, (Tn2 S)0 > (Tn1 S)0 over R++ for each
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n ∈ N \ {0}. Taking limits, it follows that V 02 ≥ V 01 over R++. Applying Lemma A.1 again and using
the fact that T1V1 = V1 and T2V2 = V2, one obtains that V
0
2 > V
0
1 over R++, as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. For each i = 1, 2, the eﬀort mappings ei and ei are strictly decreasing, or,
equivalently, the mappings q 7→ qi(q)− δq and q 7→ qi(q)− δq are strictly decreasing. Since δ ∈ (0, 1)
and both qi(0) and qi(0) are strictly positive, and since the mappings qi and qi are strictly increasing
with qi > qi, this implies that there are exactly two points q
+
i > q
−
i > 0 such that qi(q
+
i ) = q
+
i
and q
i
(q−i ) = q
−
i . Note that q
+
2 > q
+
1 since q2 > q1 over R++. It is easy to verify that both [0, q
−
i )
and (q+i ,∞] are transient sets for the transition function Pi, so that one can restrict the analysis
to [q−i , q
+
i ]. Because the mappings qi and qi are strictly increasing and continuous, Pi is monotone
and satisfies the Feller property. Moreover, since limn→∞ q
n
i (q
−
i ) = q
+
i and limn→∞ q
n
i
(q+i ) = q
−
i ,
it follows that for any qi ∈ (q−i , q+i ), there exists an integer n ≥ 1 such that Pni (q−i , [qi, q+i ]) ≥ νn
and Pni (q
+
i , [q
−
i , qi]) ≥ (1 − ν)n. Thus Pi satisfies the mixing Assumption 12.1 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989) over [q−i , q
+
i ]. As a result, there exists a unique probability measure μi over this interval that
is invariant under Pi in the sense that μi(A) =
R
Pi(q,A)μi(dq) for any Borel subset A (Stokey and
Lucas (1989, Theorem 12.12)). We now prove that max suppμi = q+i , which concludes the proof
as q+2 > q
+
1 . Suppose instead that q
+
i > max suppμi. Then, since qi(q) > q for any q < q
+
i ,
qi(q) > max suppμi for any q close enough to max suppμi. By definition of suppμi, it follows that
μi(q−1i ((max suppμi, q
+
i ))) > 0. However, as μi is invariant under Pi, one then obtains that:
μi((max suppμi, q+i )) =
Z
Pi(q, (max suppμi, q+i ))μi(dq) ≥ νμi(q−1i ((max suppμi, q+i ))) > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore max suppμi = q+i , as claimed, and similarly min suppμi = q
−
i . Finally,
note that Theorem 12.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) also ensures that for any initial quality level,
the distribution of quality converges weakly to μi. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. We first solve (5) and (20) without restrictions on quality levels, and verify
that (32) holds. Using (27)—(28) and (29)—(30) together with (26), and identifying terms in q2 in (5)
and (20), we first obtain that B1 = B2 = B, where B is the positive solution to:
B = b+
βδ2c(1 + λ)B
βB + c(1 + λ)
. (68)
Next, identifying terms in q in (5) and (20), we obtain that:
A1 =
a[βB + c(1 + λ)]− βδcB(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) (69)
and:
A2 =
a[βB + c(1 + λ)]− βδcB(1 + λ)Eθ + νβδcBλ∆θ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) . (70)
Hence A2 > A1, and since B1 = B2 = B, it follows from (27)—(29) that q2(q) > q1(q) > q1(q),
as expected. Next, from (28) and (30), q
1
(q) > q
2
(q) if and only if βA1 > βA2 − λν1−ν c∆θ. Using
(69)—(70), this condition can be rewritten as:
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ)
1− ν > β
2δB,
which clearly holds as (β, δ, ν) ∈ (0, 1)3 and B > 0. Hence q
1
(q) > q
2
(q), and (32) follows. We
now provide parameter and range restrictions under which the social value functions V1 and V2 thus
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obtained are economically meaningful. Define q+1 and q
+
2 as in the proof of Proposition 2. By
construction, the interval [0, q+2 ] is invariant under both the transition functions P1 and P2. We shall
therefore assume that q0 initially belongs to [0, q
+
2 ] and restrict our attention to this interval. A
necessary condition for our solutions to (5) and (20) to be economically meaningful over [0, q+2 ] is that
q+2 <
a
b . Using (29) to solve for q
+
2 , and taking advantage of (68) and (70), one can check after tedious
but straightforward algebraic manipulations that a suﬃcient condition for this to occur is:
θ − βδEθ
(1− δ)(1− βδ) +
νβδλ∆θ
(1 + λ)(1− δ)(1− βδ) <
a
b
. (71)
We shall hereafter assume that (71) holds. This condition immediately implies that:
(1− δ)a
b
> θ. (72)
Using (72) together with (68)—(70), one can in turn check that:
A2
B
>
A1
B
>
a
b
. (73)
The inequalities (73) capture the intuitive fact that, as long as the surplus function S is increasing,
so are the social value functions V1 and V2. In particular, the latter are increasing over [0, q
+
2 ]. We
now investigate under which conditions eﬀorts remain strictly positive over this interval. It is easy to
check from (27) and (29) that for each i = 1, 2 and q ∈ [0, q+2 ],
ei(q) =
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
Ai
B
− δq − θ
¶
>
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from (73) and the fact that q+2 <
a
b , and the second from (72). Hence
eﬀorts conditional on a high quality shock are strictly positive, and since e1(q) > e1(q), so are eﬀorts
conditional on a low quality shock under symmetric information. To conclude, one must check that
e2(q) ≥ ∆θ for all q ∈ [0, q+2 ], so that we are justified in using the quadratic specification of ψ when
writing down the informational rent of the high type agent, see (31). From (30), one has:
e2(q) =
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
A2
B
− δq − θ
¶
− λνc∆θ
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)] .
Proceeding as above, we obtain that for each q ∈ [0, q+2 ],
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
A2
B
− δq − θ
¶
>
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
.
Hence a suﬃcient condition for e2(q) ≥ ∆θ to hold for all q ∈ [0, q+2 ] is that:h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
βB >
∙
λνc
1− ν + βB + c(1 + λ)
¸
∆θ. (74)
Note from (68) that B is independent of θ, θ and ∆θ. Hence, given (72), (74) typically holds if
∆θ is close enough to zero. It is straightforward to find parameter values such that (71) and (74)
simultaneously hold. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix some t = 0, 1, . . . . From (27)—(30), E [q1,t+1 |q1,t = q] > E [q2,t+1 |q2,t = q]
if and only if βA1 > βA2 − λνc∆θ. Using (69)—(70), this condition can be rewritten as:
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) > β2δB,
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which clearly holds as (β, δ, ν) ∈ (0, 1)3 and B > 0. Therefore (33) follows. As for (34), it is an
immediate consequence of (32). For further reference, note that:
Var [q1,t+1 |q1,t = q] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Varθ, (75)
Var [q2,t+1 |q2,t = q] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Varθ +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 , (76)
as is easy to check from (27)—(30). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. From (27)—(28) and (29)—(30), it follows that for each t = 0, 1, . . . ,
E [q1,t+1] =
βA1 + c(1 + λ)(Eθ + δE [q1,t])
βB + c(1 + λ)
,
E [q2,t+1] =
βA2 − λνc∆θ + c(1 + λ)(Eθ + δE [q2,t])
βB + c(1 + λ)
.
Taking limits as t goes to infinity, one obtains that:
Eμ1 =
βA1 + c(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− δ) ,
Eμ2 =
βA2 − λνc∆θ + c(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− δ) ,
from which (35) follows as βA1 > βA2 − λνc∆θ. Next, for each i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, . . . ,
E [Var [qi,t+1 |qi,t]] = E [q2i,t+1]− E [E [qi,t+1 |qi,t]2]
= E [q2i,t+1]− E
"∙
E [qi,t+1] +
cδ(1 + λ)(qi,t − E[qi,t])
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2#
= Var [qi,t+1]−
∙
cδ(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Var [qi,t],
where the second equality follows from (27)—(28) and (29)—(30). Using (75)—(76), this yields:
Var [q1,t+1] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
(Varθ + δ2Var [q1,t]),
Var [q2,t+1] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
(Varθ + δ2Var [q2,t]) +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)]2
for each t = 0, 1, . . . . Taking limits as t goes to infinity, one obtains that:
Varμ1 =
c2(1 + λ)2Varθ
[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2 ,
Varμ2 =
c2(1 + λ)2Varθ
[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2 +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν){[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2} ,
from which (36) follows. Hence the result. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 6. Using date 1 and 2 qualities and date 0 rents as control variables, the regulator’s
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
(q˜1,q˜2,U˜0)
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜1(θ0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q˜1(θ0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq˜1(θ0)− θ1) + β2S(q˜2(θ0, θ1))] (77)
−λνU˜0(θ)− λ(1− ν)U˜0(θ)− λν2βΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))− λν(1− ν)βΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))},
subject to the constraints:
U˜0(θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) ≥ U˜0(θ) + Φ(q0, q˜1(θ)) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)), (78)
U˜0(θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) ≥ U˜0(θ)− Φ(q0, q˜1(θ)) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)), (79)
U˜0(θ) ≥ 0, (80)
U˜0(θ) ≥ 0. (81)
Let (q2,1, q2,2, U2,0) be the solution to this problem. One first has the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ).
Proof. An immediate implication of (78)—(79) is that Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) ≥ Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)). Since Φ(q, q) is
strictly increasing in q for q > δq + θ, we need only to show that q2,1(θ) > δq0 + θ. Suppose the
contrary holds, and consider the following modification of (q2,1, q2,2, U2,0). First, keep q˜1(θ), q˜2, and
U˜0(θ) the same as in the original contract, so that (81) is preserved. Second, let q˜1(θ) = δq0+θ+ε for
some ε > 0, and let U˜0(θ) = U2,0(θ)+ νβΦ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) so as to maintain
the same level of intertemporal rents for a good type agent at date 0. As a result of this, (78) is
preserved. Next, since q˜1(θ) > q2,1(θ) and Φ is increasing with respect to its second argument, (79)
is also preserved. Finally, since q˜1(θ) > q2,1(θ) and Φ is decreasing with respect to its first argument,
one obtains that U˜0(θ) ≥ U2,0(θ) so that (80) is preserved. The new contract is therefore incentive
feasible, and yields the same expected intertemporal rent to the agent as the original contract. The
condition ψ0(0) = 0 then implies that, for ε close enough to zero, this contract yields a strictly higher
expected social welfare at date 0 than the original contract, a contradiction. ¤
In turns out that which constraints are binding at the optimum depends on the sign of the following
quantities:
∆r = Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
, (82)
∆i = −Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
. (83)
∆r is the date 0 rent that must be left to a high type agent whenever (39) and (42) are the binding
constraints. For (41) to be satisfied, one must then have ∆r ≥ 0. Similarly, ∆i is the date 0 rent that
must be left to a low type agent whenever (40) and (41) are the binding constraints. For (42) to be
satisfied, one must then have ∆i ≥ 0. The following lemma holds.
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Lemma A.3. ∆r and ∆i cannot be both non-negative unless they are both equal to zero. Moreover,
at least one of the following assertions is true:
(i) ∆r ≥ 0 ≥ ∆i, in which case (39) and (42) are binding;
(ii) ∆i ≥ 0 ≥ ∆r, in which case (40) and (41) are binding.
Proof. We first establish that ∆r and ∆i cannot be both non-negative unless they are both equal to
zero. Suppose the contrary holds. Then, by (82)—(83),
Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) ≥ νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
≥ Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)),
with at least one strict inequality. This however implies that Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) > Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)), which
contradicts (39)—(40). This implies the claim.
Suppose next that ∆r ≥ 0 at the optimum contract. Observing that one can rewrite (39) as
u2,0(θ)− ψ(e2,0(θ)) ≥ u2,0(θ)− ψ(e2,0(θ)) +∆r using (82), it necessarily follows that (42) is binding,
since otherwise reducing u2,0(θ) and u2,0(θ) by some small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints
and increase social welfare. Similarly, (39) must be binding since otherwise reducing u2,0(θ) by some
small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare. Similar arguments
imply that if ∆i ≥ 0 at the optimum contract, then (40) and (41) must be binding.
To conclude the proof, we must only check that ∆r and ∆i cannot be both strictly negative.
Suppose the contrary holds. Then, observing that one can rewrite (39) as u2,0(θ) − ψ(e2,0(θ)) ≥
u2,0(θ)−ψ(e2,0(θ))+∆r using (82), and (40) as u2,0(θ)−ψ(e2,0(θ)) ≥ u2,0(θ)−ψ(e2,0(θ))+∆i using
(83), it is clear that (39) and (42) cannot be both binding, as this would violate (41) since ∆r < 0,
and that (40) and (41) cannot be both binding, as this would violate (42) since ∆i < 0. Now, suppose
that (41) is slack. Then (42) must be binding, since otherwise reducing u2,0(θ) and u2,0(θ) by some
small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare. Thus, as (39) and (42)
cannot be both binding, (39) must be slack. But (39) and (41) cannot both be slack, since otherwise
reducing u2,0(θ) by some small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare.
Hence, (41) must be binding, contrary to the assumption. A similar reasoning implies that (42) must
be binding as well. Since (39) and (42) cannot be both binding, and similarly for (40) and (41), this
implies that (39)—(40) are slack. Therefore, for a given value of q0, the function q2,2 solves:
max
q˜2
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq2,1(θ0)− θ1) + βS(q˜2(θ0, θ1))]
−λν2Φ(q2,1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))−λν(1− ν)Φ(q2,1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))}.
It follows that q2,2(θ, θ) = Q2,2(q2,1(θ)) and q2,2(θ, θ) = Q2,2(q2,1(θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q2,2(q1)
is implicitly defined by:14
βS0(Q2,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)). (84)
The condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that E2,1(q1) = Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ remains strictly positive for each
q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is easy to check from (84) that the function E2,1 is strictly
decreasing, which implies in turn that the informational rent:
Φ(q1,Q2,2(q1)) = ψ(E2,1(q1))− ψ(E2,1(q1)−∆θ)
14Note that (84) is formally analogous to the first-order condition (22) for q
2
(q) derived in the stationary
model with multiple agents. Indeed, it is easy to see that (84) gives the sequentially rational date 2 optimal
quality policy given that θ1 = θ.
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is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆r < 0 and q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ) by Lemma A.2, one has:
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q2,1(θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(θ),Q2,2(q2,1(θ)))− Φ(q2,1(θ),Q2,2(q2,1(θ)))
i
≤ 0,
a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
To determine which of cases (i) or (ii) of Lemma A.3 holds, we first need the following result.
Lemma A.4. ∆i ≤ 0.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that ∆i > 0. Then, by Lemma A.3, (40) and (41) are
binding. Moreover, a low type agent is left with a strictly positive rent ∆i at date 0, so that (42) is
slack. Therefore, for a given value of q0, the function q2,2 solves:
max
q˜2
©
E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− q2,1(θ0)− θ1) + βS(q˜2(θ0, θ1))]− λνΦ(q2,1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))
ª
.
It follows that q2,2(θ, θ) = Q3,2(q2,1(θ)) and q2,2(θ, θ) = Q1,2(q2,1(θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q3,2(q1)
and Q1,2(q1) are implicitly defined by:
βS0(Q3,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λ
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q3,2(q1)). (85)
βS0(Q1,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ), (86)
The condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that E1,1(q1) = Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ and E3,1(q1) = Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ
remain strictly positive for each q1 ≥ 0. Since one clearly has Q3,2(q1) < Q1,2(q1) by (86)—(85), this
implies that Φ(q1,Q3,2(q1)) < Φ(q1,Q1,2(q1)) for each q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is
easy to check from (86) that the function E1,1 is strictly decreasing, which implies in turn that the
informational rent:
Φ(q1,Q1,2(q1)) = ψ(E1,1(q1))− ψ(E1,1(q1)−∆θ)
is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆i > 0 and q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ) by Lemma A.2, one has:
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q2,1(θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(θ),Q3,2(q2,1(θ)))− Φ(q2,1(θ),Q1,2(q2,1(θ)))
i
< νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(θ),Q1,2(q2,1(θ)))− Φ(q2,1(θ),Q1,2(q2,1(θ)))
i
≤ 0,
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a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
Finally, the following lemma rules out the case ∆i = 0 > ∆r.
Lemma A.5. ∆r ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that ∆r < 0. Then, by Lemmas A.3 and A.4, ∆i = 0, so
that (40)—(42) are binding. Observing that one can rewrite (39) as u2,0(θ) − ψ(e2,0(θ)) ≥ u2,0(θ) −
ψ(e2,0(θ)) + ∆r using (82), it necessarily follows that (39) is slack. Now turn to the formulation
(77)—(81) of the regulator’s problem. We know from the proof of Lemma A.2 that q2,1(θ) > δq0 + θ.
It is easy to check that this implies that (78)—(81) satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification
conditions at the optimum. Denote by η1, η2, η3 and η4 the corresponding multipliers. As (78) is
slack at the optimum, η1 = 0. It follows that q2,2(θ, θ) = Q4,2(q2,1(θ)) and q2,2(θ, θ) = Q5,2(q2,1(θ)),
where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q4,2(q1) and Q5,2(q1) are implicitly defined by:
βS0(Q4,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q4,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν + η2
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q4,2(q1)), (87)
βS0(Q5,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q5,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
[λ(1− ν)− η2]ν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q5,2(q1)). (88)
Optimizing with respect to U˜0(θ) yields η2 + η4 = λ(1 − ν), so that η2 ≤ λ(1 − ν). The condition
ψ0(0) = 0 then ensures that E5,1(q1) = Q5,2(q1) − δq1 − θ remains strictly positive for each q1 ≥ 0.
Since one clearly has Q4,2(q1) ≤ Q5,2(q1) by (87)—(88), Φ(q1,Q4,2(q1)) ≤ Φ(q1,Q5,2(q1)) for each
q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is easy to check from (88) that the function E5,1 is strictly
decreasing, which implies in turn that the informational rent:
Φ(q1,Q5,2(q1)) = ψ(E5,1(q1))− ψ(E5,1(q1)−∆θ)
is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆r < 0 and q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ) by Lemma A.2, one has:
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q2,1(θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(θ),Q4,2(q2,1(θ)))− Φ(q2,1(θ),Q5,2(q2,1(θ)))
i
≤ νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(θ),Q5,2(q2,1(θ)))− Φ(q2,1(θ),Q5,2(q2,1(θ)))
i
≤ 0,
a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
To conclude the proof, simply observe that Lemmas A.4 and A.5 imply that case (i) of Lemma
A.3 obtains. Thus (39) and (42) are binding, and the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. We first prove that q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ). In the regular case, this follows
from (52)—(53) together with q2,1(θ) ≥ q2,1(θ). Consider next the irregular case. Two subcases must
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be distinguished. Suppose first that (79) or equivalently (47) is binding. From the proof of Lemma
A.2, we know that q2,1(θ) > δq0 + θ, and hence Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) = Φ(q0, q2,1(θ)) > 0. Since U2,0(θ) = 0,
it follows that Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) > Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)), which implies that q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) as
claimed. Suppose next that (79) or equivalently (47) is slack. Since U2,0(θ) = 0, Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) ≥
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)). As (47) is slack, we need only to prove that this implies that q2,2(θ, θ)−q2,2(θ, θ) ≥
δ[q2,1(θ) − q2,1(θ)]. Again, this will be the case if q2,2(θ, θ) > δq2,1(θ) + θ. Suppose the contrary
holds, and consider the following modification of (q2,1, q2,2, U2,0). First, keep q˜1, q˜2(θ, θ), q˜2(θ, θ),
q˜2(θ, θ) and U˜0 the same as in the original contract, so that (80)—(81) are preserved. Second, let
q˜2(θ, θ) = δq2,1(θ) + θ + ε for some ε > 0. Since q˜2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) and Φ is increasing in its second
argument, (78) is preserved. Moreover, since (79) is slack, it is preserved in the new contract if ε is close
enough to zero, which ensures that the new contract is incentive feasible. The condition ψ0(0) = 0 then
implies that, for ε close enough to zero, this contract yields a strictly higher expected social welfare
at date 0 than the original contract, a contradiction. Thus q2,2(θ, θ) > δq2,1(θ) + θ, which implies
that q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) as claimed. Note that (Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)),Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ))) 6= (0, 0),
so that (47)—(48) satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification conditions at the optimum.
We now show that the level of distortions at date 1 is strictly higher following θ0 = θ than following
θ0 = θ. Let ξ2 be the multiplier associated to (48). Then, from (47)—(49), the first-order conditions
for q2,2(θ, θ) and q2,2(θ, θ) are given by:
βS0(q2,2(θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ)− δq2,1(θ)− θ) +
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)), (89)
βS0(q2,2(θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ)− δq2,1(θ)− θ) +
(λ− ξ2)ν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)). (90)
We need to prove that (λ − ξ2)ν > ξ2(1 − ν) or equivalently λν > ξ2. If ξ2 = 0 this is immediate.
Suppose next that ξ2 > 0, so that (48) is binding. Then, proceeding as above, one obtains that
q2,2(θ, θ) − δq2,1(θ) ≥ q2,2(θ, θ) − δq2,1(θ). Since ψ0 is convex, it therefore follows from (18) that
Φ2(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) ≥ Φ2(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)). Suppose now that ξ2 ≥ λν. Then the right-hand side
of (89) is greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (90). This is however impossible since
q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) and S is strictly concave. Thus λν > ξ2, and the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that pooling over date 1 qualities occurs in equilibrium, and let ξ1 and
ξ2 be the multipliers associated to (47)—(48). Using the Envelope Theorem, the first-order conditions
for q2,1(θ) = q2,1(θ) = q
p
2,1 can be written as follows:
βS0(qp2,1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp2,1 − δq0 − θ)− βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ1))− δqp2,1 − θ1)
¤
(91)
− ξ1
ν
+ ξ2βΦ1(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)),
βS0(qp2,1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp2,1 − δq0 − θ)− βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ1))− δqp2,1 − θ1)
¤
+
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1) +
λνβ
1− ν Φ1(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)), (92)
+
ξ1
1− ν −
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1)−
ξ2νβ
1− ν Φ1(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)),
The following lemma holds.
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Lemma A.6. If q0 is close enough to 0, q
p
2,1 − δq0 > q2,2(θ, θ)− δq
p
2,1.
Proof. Using the definition of Φ, and in particular the fact that Φ1 = −δΦ2, one can rewrite (91) as:
βS0(qp2,1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp2,1 − δq0 − θ)− (1 + λ)Φ2(q0, q
p
1,2)− βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ1))− δqp2,1 − θ1)
¤
(93)
− ξ1
ν
− ξ2βδΦ2(qp2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)).
Since S is concave and ψ is convex, and since λν > ξ2 as shown in the proof of Proposition 7, it follows
from (90) and (93) that if q2,2(θ, θ)− δqp2,1 ≥ q
p
2,1 − δq0, then q
p
2,1 ≥ q2,2(θ, θ) and therefore q0 ≥ q
p
2,1.
But if q0 is close to zero, this is inconsistent with a positive eﬀort being exerted at date 0 by a high
type agent, in contradiction to (91). Hence qp2,1 − δq0 > q2,2(θ, θ)− δq
p
2,1, as claimed. ¤
We are now ready to complete the proof. Using (50)—(51) together with the definition of Φ, one
can rearrange (91)—(92) to obtain:
ξ1
µ
1
ν
+
1
1− ν
¶
= −(1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)
£
ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ)− δqp2,1 − θ)− ψ0(q2,2(θ, θ)− δq
p
2,1 − θ)
¤
−
µ
1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
¶
Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1) +
λνβδ
1− ν Φ2(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)) (94)
− ξ2βδΦ2(qp2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)) +
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1)−
ξ2νβδ
1− ν Φ2(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)).
Since q2,2(θ, θ) > q2,2(θ, θ) by Proposition 7, and since the functions ψ and Φ(q
p
2,1, ·) are convex, it
therefore follows that:
ξ1
ν
< (λν − ξ2)
£
βδΦ2(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ))− Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1)
¤
. (95)
By Lemma A.6, qp2,1 − δq0 > q2,2(θ, θ)− δq
p
2,1 for q0 close enough to 0. Hence, since a high type agent
exerts a positive eﬀort at date 0, Φ2(q0, q
p
2,1) > Φ2(q
p
2,1, q2,2(θ, θ)). Moreover, λν > ξ2 as shown in the
proof of Proposition 7. Hence (95) implies that if βδ ≤ 1, then ξ1 < 0, a contradiction. Thus pooling
over date 1 qualities can occur only if βδ > 1, as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 9. To construct the optimal contract, we first conjecture that (48) is slack at the
optimum, which we will verify ex-post. As a result of this, the multiplier ξ2 of (48) is equal to zero.
From (50)—(53), we obtain:
q2,2(θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq2,1(θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (96)
q2,2(θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq2,1(θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (97)
q2,2(θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq2,1(θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (98)
q2,2(θ, θ) =
βa− λν(1−ν)2 c∆θ + c(1 + λ)[θ + δq2,1(θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
. (99)
For (96)—(99) to hold, one must ensure that whatever q2,1(θ) and q2,1(θ) might be, provided they
remain smaller than ab , the date 1 eﬀorts stay positive, and that e2,1(θ, θ) ≥ ∆θ and e2,1(θ, θ) ≥ ∆θ, so
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that we are justified in using the quadratic specification of ψ when writing down the informational rents
Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)) and Φ(q2,1(θ), q2,2(θ, θ)), see (31). It is easy to check that a suﬃcient condition
for this to be true is that (72) holds and that:h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
βb >
∙
λνc
(1− ν)2 + βb+ c(1 + λ)
¸
∆θ, (100)
which, given (72), typically holds if ∆θ is close enough to zero. To show that pooling can occur, let
us evaluate the multiplier ξ1 of (47) using (94). This yields:
ξ1 = −c∆θν(1− ν)ϕδ(β), (101)
where:
ϕδ(β) = 1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
∙
βδc(1 + λ)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
+ 1− βδ .¸ (102)
For each δ > 0, the function ϕδ is strictly decreasing, with ϕδ(0) > 0 and limβ→∞ ϕδ(β) = −∞.
Let β(δ) = ϕ−1δ (0). Clearly β(δ) > 1 and limδ→1 β(δ) < ∞. Thus ξ1 > 0 if β > β(δ). For the
corresponding allocation to be economically meaningful, q2,1(θ) = q2,1(θ) = q
p
2,1 must remain smaller
than ab . For q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to zero, it is easy to check this will be the case if β < β(δ),
where β(δ) is the positive solution to (54). From (54), one has:
ϕδ(β(δ)) = 1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
∙
c(1 + λ)
β(δ)(1− δ)b
+ 1− β(δ)δ ,¸ (103)
as well as limδ→1 β(δ) = ∞ and limδ→1 β(δ)(1 − δ) = 1. Thus (103) implies that limδ→1 ϕδ(β(δ)) =
−∞. Moreover, β(δ) > β(δ) whenever δ is close enough to one. Thus, pooling can occur if β ∈
[β(δ),β(δ)).15 To check that this can indeed be the case, one needs only to find parameter restrictions
such that U2,0(θ) > 0, so that (48) is slack as postulated. From (31), (43), and (98)—(99), one has:
U2,0(θ) = c∆θ
µ
qp2,1 − δq0 −
θ + θ
2
¶
− (c∆θ)2 λν
2β
(1− ν)2[βb+ c(1 + λ)] ,
which is strictly positive for q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to zero. Since ϕδ is independent from q0, θ
and ∆θ, the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 10. For each t = 1, 2, let q2,t and q2,t be the functions mapping date t−1 quality
into date t quality following respectively a high and low quality shock at date t− 1 in the model with
a sequence of agents. Note that q2,2 = Q1,2, while q2,2 = Q2,2 as defined by (84). When there is
a single agent, it follows from (53) that q2,2(θ, θ) = Q6,2(q2,1(θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q6,2(q1) is
implicitly defined by:
βS0(Q6,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q6,2(q1)). (104)
We first compare q2,1(q0) and q2,1(θ). It is helpful to define two functions Ω and Ξ as follows:
Ω(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)− λνβδΦ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)),
15Consider by contrast what happens when δ is close to zero. From (54), one has limδ→0 β(δ) = ∞ and
limδ→0 β(δ)δ = 1. It follows from (103) that limδ→0 ϕδ(β(δ)) = 1 + λ. Since ϕδ is decreasing, we obtain that,
for δ close enough to zero, ϕδ(β) > 0 for any β ≤ β(δ), and thus pooling over date 1 qualities cannot occur.
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and:
Ξ(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ).
Thus the diﬀerence Ω(q1)− Ξ(q1) is proportional to:
(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)− (1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)−
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)),
which is negative from the first-order conditions (37) and (84) that define Q1,2(q1) and Q2,2(q1) for a
given value of q1. Now, from the Envelope Theorem, one has:
βS0(q2,1(q0)) = Ω(q2,1(q0)),
βS0(q2,1(θ)) = Ξ(q2,1(θ)).
Since S is strictly concave, it follows that q2,1(q0) > q2,1(θ), as claimed.
We next compare q
2,1
(q0) and q2,1(θ). It is helpful to define two functions Ω and Ξ as follows:
Ω(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)− λνβδΦ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q1),
and:
Ξ(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q1) +
λνβ
1− ν Φ1(q1,Q6,2(q1)).
Since Φ1 = −δΦ2, the diﬀerence Ω(q1)− Ξ(q1) is proportional to:
(1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q6,2(q1))
− (1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)−
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)),
which is positive from the first-order conditions (84) and (104) that define Q2,2(q1) and Q6,2(q1) for
a given value of q1. Now, from the Envelope Theorem, one has:
βS0(q
2,1
(q0)) = Ω(q2,1(q0)),
βS0(q2,1(θ)) = Ξ(q2,1(θ)).
Since S is strictly concave, it follows that q2,1(θ) > q2,1(q0), as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Since λν > ξ2 in (89)—(90), the optimal contract with a sequence of agents
does not satisfy the necessary optimality conditions (89)—(90) for the optimal long-term contract with
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a single agent. Thus, it suﬃces to show that it satisfies the analogues of constraints (39)—(42) when θ
is close enough to θ. The participation constraints are satisfied by construction. One thus only needs
to check that the dynamic incentive compatibility constraints hold.
Given a high quality shock, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)) ≥ νβ
h
Φ(q
2,1
(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))− Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))
i
. (105)
To show that (105) holds when θ is close enough to θ, we proceed as follows. From (18) and the
convexity of ψ, one has:
Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)) ≥ ∆θψ
0(q
2,1
(q0)− δq0 − θ). (106)
Consider now the right-hand side of (105). The function q
2,2
is diﬀerentiable. It is easy to check that
its derivative is uniformly bounded above by δ, reflecting the fact that date 1 eﬀorts are decreasing
with respect to date 1 quality, in analogy with the basic model. In particular, Φ(q1, q2,2(q1)) is a
strictly decreasing function of q1. Since q2,1(q0) > q2,1(q0), one has:
Φ(q
2,1
(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0))) − Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))
(107)
≤
h
q2,1(q0)− q2,1(q0)
i
sup
q1∈[q
2,1
(q0),q2,1(q0)]
½¯¯¯¯
d
dq1
Φ(q1, q2,2(q1))
¯¯¯¯¾
.
Moreover, since q0
2,2
≤ δ and Φ1 = −δΦ2, one has, for each q1,¯¯¯¯
d
dq1
Φ(q1, q2,2(q1))
¯¯¯¯
≤ 2δΦ2(q1, q2,2(q1)) ≤ 2δ∆θψ
00(q
2,2
(q1)− δq1 − θ), (108)
where the second inequality follows from (18) and the convexity of ψ0. Thus, from (106)—(108),
Φ(q
2,1
(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0))) − Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))
(109)
≤
h
q2,1(q0)− q2,1(q0)
i 2δ supq1∈[q
2,1
(q0),q2,1(q0)]
n
ψ00(q
2,2
(q1)− δq1 − θ)
o
ψ0(q
2,1
(q0)− δq0 − θ)
Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)).
It is easy to check that when θ converges to θ from above, the policy functions q2,1 and q2,1 converge
pointwise to a function q2,1, and the policy function q2,2 converges pointwise to a function q2,2. The
policy functions q2,1 and q2,2 correspond to the limit case where ∆θ = 0. In particular, the diﬀerence
q2,1(q0)− q2,1(q0) goes to zero as θ converges to θ, while the ratio:
ψ0(q
2,1
(q0)− δq0 − θ)
2δ supq1∈[q
2,1
(q0),q2,1(q0)]
n
ψ00(q
2,2
(q1)− δq1 − θ)
o
stays bounded away from zero. It thus follows from (109) that:
Φ(q
2,1
(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))− Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0))) = o(Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)))
as θ goes to θ, so that the incentive compatibility constraint (105) holds for θ close enough to θ.
Given a low quality shock, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
Φ(q0, q2,1(q0))− Φ(q0, q2,1(q0)) ≥ νβ
h
Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))− Φ(q2,1(q0), q2,2(q2,1(q0)))
i
. (110)
Since q2,1(q0) > q2,1(q0), the left-hand side of (110) is positive, while the right-hand side is negative as
Φ(q1, q2,2(q1)) is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Hence (110) is automatically satisfied no matter
the parameter values. The result follows. ¥
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